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DIALOGIC, PARTICIPATION AND THE 
POTENTIAL FOR PHILOSOPHY FOR 
CHILDREN 
                                                                 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper considers the role of dialogue in the participation of children and examines the 
extent to which Philosophy for Children can be conceptualised as a dialogic participatory 
mechanism. It examines ways in which dialogue has been linked to participation in the 
literature and differentiates between those approaches which focus on dialogue as 
pedagogic device and those which emphasise its participatory potential. A theoretical 
exploration of dialogue is pursued using three questions to interrogate the complex and 
contested body of literature exploring dialogic approaches. These focus on the possibility 
that dialogue offers an alternative philosophical approach to children’s voice, 
mechanisms of transformation in dialogic encounters, and the problems posed by 
inequality between dialogic partners. This exploration prepares the ground to consider 
Philosophy for Children’s potential as a dialogical participatory mechanism. It is 
concluded that where practitioners are able to tolerate the perplexity and discomfort of 
genuinely open dialogue, then Philosophy for Children can be regarded as dialogic. It is 
recognised that the many competing agendas operating in schools might influence the 
extent to which dialogue can remain open. If Philosophy for Children is to operate as a 
participatory mechanism, then it is argued that there is a need to develop a praxis focus 
within communities of philosophical inquiry.  Political difficulties resulting from 
inequalities between the participants in a community of inquiry are acknowledged. It is 
concluded that practitioners need to adopt and maintain critical reflexivity if they are to 
avoid an instrumental approach to the practice of Philosophy for Children and ensure that 
its dialogic and participatory potential is developed.  
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Focus 
 
Recent interest in dialogic approaches in education is reflected in a growing literature.  
 
This interest has been largely directed towards enhancing children’s learning 
 
( Mercer and Middleton, 2007;Wegerif, 2007),  however dialogic approaches have also 
 
been suggested as a means to support citizenship education ( Deakin Crick, Coates,  
 
Taylor and Ritchie, 2004), and to facilitate children’s participation ( Fielding,  2004,  
 
Hill, Davis, Prout and Tidsall, 2004). This paper specifically explores what dialogic  
 
approaches might offer  those working towards greater participative  involvement of   
 
children.  It also considers the extent to which Philosophy for Children, as one particular  
 
approach to  involving  children in dialogue, might be conceptualised as a dialogic,  
 
participatory mechanism.  
 
 
 
1.2 Dialogic approaches to children’s participation 
 
The following discussion explores the transformative potential of dialogic approaches.  
 
The possibility of transformation is likely to capture the interest of those seeking to work  
 
with children in ways which are genuinely participatory.  If practices around participation  
 
lack transformative potential, then it can be argued,  they are open to charges of  
 
tokenism.  Concern has been raised about the current emphasis on children’s ‘voice’ and   
 
it has been suggested that  ‘voice’ alone has limited transformative  potential (Lundy, 
 
2007).  Fielding (2004), contends that including previously silenced voices is not  
 
necessarily empowering.  Traditional epistemologies, in his view, are unable to capture  
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the voices required.  The inability of objectivist epistemologies to take account of  
 
subjectivities has been a matter  debate particularly within the discipline of psychology  
 
(Sampson, 1981). Objectivist approaches to children’s voice can be viewed as  
 
problematic as  they do not take account of the differences between children in terms of  
 
their experiences.  If children represent diverse groups then in selecting only some  
 
voices others are silenced.  Extreme relativist approaches, such as those underpinning  
 
critical voice research  however encounter other difficulties  (Arnot and Reay, 2007).  
 
Such approaches, it is argued, merely celebrate the diversity of voices and are ultimately  
 
politically impotent ( Moore and Muller, 1999).  
 
 
 
Fielding (2004), responding to the difficulties identified with critical voice work, 
 
suggests that dialogic approaches go beyond  ‘voice’ and therefore make an important  
 
contribution to children’s participation. Others writing in this area also consider the  
 
potential  of dialogic approaches (Hill, Davis, Prout and Tidsall, 2004;  Fattore and  
 
Turnbull, 2005).  This paper therefore explores what dialogic approaches offers  
 
participatory practice by  providing a critical theoretical exploration of  dialogic  
 
approaches, their potential for  transformation and some of the difficulties which might  
 
be encountered.   
 
 
 
1.2 Philosophy for Children  
 
The paper also builds on this exploration to consider the extent to which Philosophy  
 
for Children can be conceptualised as a dialogic, participatory mechanism. Todd (2007),  
 
suggests  Philosophy for Children as  an example of ‘authentic participation’ ( p147).   
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Philosophy for Children was developed by Matthew Lipman  based on the Socratic  
 
tradition of dialogue.  The classroom becomes a community of inquiry focused on 
 
exploration and questioning  (McGuiness, 2005).   All discussion in Philosophy for  
 
Children sessions is generated through children’s questions in response to stimuli such as  
 
poems, pictures or stories.  Democratic processes determine which questions are given  
 
most discussion time and the teacher’s role within the discussion is facilitative rather   
 
than  authoritative (Haynes, 2002).  It was established as an educational programme in  
 
the 1970s, but has received more attention in the last decade (Vansieleghem, 2005).  
 
 
Philosophy for Children emphasises logic and criticality and has been identified as a key  
 
thinking skills approach (McGuiness, 2005).  Research evidence links it to gains in  
 
ability and attainment  (Trickey and Topping , 2004; Topping and Trickey, 2007),  and  
 
to positive shifts in  pupil interactions within the classroom (Topping and Trickey, 2007).  
 
The link to gains in ability as measured by increased IQ scores, may be of particular  
 
interest to educators given that IQ scores  predict individual differences in school  
 
attainment ‘moderately well’ ( Neisser et al., 1996). The link between gains in IQ scores  
 
and Philosophy for Children has prompted media interest  in the development of  
 
Philosophy for Children in schools in two local authorities in Scotland (Cook, 2007;  
 
Denholme,2008). Although these findings have generated interest and enthusiasm for  
 
Philosophy Children, it is also possible that the focus on the impact on individual  
 
cognitive skills might narrow theoretical interest in the processes involved in  
 
philosophical dialogue in classrooms.  Wegerif  (2008), considers research on the impact  
 
of exploratory talk on children’s reasoning ability as measured by Raven’s matrices. He  
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argues that the ground rules of exploratory talk (similar to those of Philosophy for  
 
Children) are important in opening up ‘space’ for reflection which enables the emergence  
 
of a creative approaches to problem solving.  Wegerif argues therefore that there is a need  
 
for research which look at how to enhance the ‘creative quality of  relationships’. This  
 
can be applied to research in the Philosophy for Children.  
 
 
 
Although Philosophy for Children is currently best known as a thinking skills approach,   
 
historically it has served a progressive educational agenda and has been argued to be  
 
important in  the preparation of children for citizenship  within a democratic society 
 
 ( Fisher, 2003; Vanseileghem, 2005).  Philosophy for Children is an approach which is  
 
entirely focussed on dialogue. Todd’s suggestion develops out of her wider theoretical  
 
consideration of participation but she does not provide a  theoretical explanation of the  
 
specific role that dialogue might play in enhancing the  participation of children through  
 
philosophical inquiry. Having explored the potential of dialogic approaches for the  
 
participation of  children, this paper will go on to  assess the extent  to which  Philosophy  
 
for Children can  be conceptualised as a dialogic, participatory mechanism.  
 
 
 
In order to address the central concerns of this paper, it is important to consider links 
 
between dialogue and participation.  Section two will consider how dialogue has been  
 
linked to participation within the literature.  Section three will explore theoretical  
 
considerations of dialogic approaches and will prepare the way for discussion in section  
 
four on the extent to which Philosophy for Children can be conceptualised as dialogic  
 
participatory mechanism.   
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SECTION 2 Participation and dialogue 
 
2.1 Dialogue, Education and Children’s Participation 
 
The use of dialogue as an educational tool can be traced to Socrates (Renshaw,  
 
2004).  The Socratic tradition positions the teacher as facilitator in the student’s search 
 
for evidence using a reasoned argument and  has implications for power relations  
 
between teachers and learners.  A more radical tradition, using dialogue to increase  
 
participation and shift  power relations in education and in the wider society,  can be seen  
 
in the work of adult literacy educators  Paulo Freire, and Lorenzo Milani. Both Freire and 
 
Milani emphasised the role of dialogue in participation  in their work (Mayo, 2007).  
 
 
Dialogic approaches have more recently been emphasised as important to children’s  
 
learning (Mercer and Littleton, 2007; Wegerif, 2007). The pedagogic role of dialogue  
 
has been extensively theorised. Explanations in this sphere have been based  largely,  
 
although not exclusively, on sociocultural theory  (Wegerif, 2007), and focus on  
 
children’s intellectual progression. The potential impact of these approaches on  power  
 
relationships within the classroom has been recognised ( Mercer and Littleton, 2007). 
 
Dialogic pedagogies have also been emphasised in a recent review of research on 
 
citizenship education  ( Deakin Crick, Coates, Taylor, and Ritchie, 2004).   Deakin Crick  
 
et  al.,  identify dialogue as a pedagogic approach which enables children to develop the  
 
skills required to participate as citizens in their adult lives. 
 
 
 
Deakin Crick and Joldersma (2007), have developed a theoretical approach to citizenship 
 
education on the basis of Habermas’s theory of society,  which regards communication  
 
as central to participation in a democratic society. They recognise that Habermas’s notion  
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of democracy widens the scope of  political participation beyond the formal institutions  
 
of politics across social and cultural institutions and organisations, such as schools.  
 
They suggest the need for a ‘transformative, dialogical and participatory’ ( p87)  
 
pedagogical approach in schools to support children’s  development and prepare them for  
 
participation in the various public arenas in which democracy is enacted.  One 
 
difficulty with Deakin Crick and Joldersma’s approach is its emphasis on citizenship 
 
education as a training ground for  children’s  future participation. Habermas, it can be  
 
argued, construes  children as  ‘becomings’(Christensen and Prout, 2002).    He draws on  
 
psychoanalytic notions of ego development and Kohlberg’s theory of moral development,  
 
to argue that  children need to be socialized into democratic participation (Habermas  
 
1979; Habermas, 1987).  Deakin Crick and Joldersma ( 2007), like Habermas,  appear to  
 
regard citizenship  education as a means of developing tomorrow’s citizens and schools  
 
as institutions of  socialisation. Although dialogue features prominently in their approach,  
 
it is arguably viewed as a pedagogic rather than as a participatory device. This is  
 
demonstrated by their emphasis on the ‘development’ of skills ( p78). 
 
 
 
Hill, Davis, Prout, and Tidsall, (2004), contend  that citizenship education in schools is  
 
problematic as it is often interpreted as a  means  of  preparing  children to  exercise their  
 
adult  rights,  failing to see children as citizens in their own right.  This is a distinction  
 
also picked up by Biesta in his consideration of education and democracy (Biesta,  2006).  
 
He argues that education for democracy involves teaching skills to prepare children for   
 
future participation in democratic life. Education through democracy however, involves  
 
the creation of  democratic structures in schools, such as pupil councils, to facilitate 
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children’s decision making. In Biesta’s view, both approaches focus on how best to  
 
prepare children for the future. An education through democracy approach, affords a  
 
decision making role for children; however this has an educative rather than  a political  
 
function. It is therefore argued that not all opportunities given to children to engage in  
 
decision making arenas are motivated by a desire to see them exercise political influence  
 
in their own right. Whitty and Wisby (2007), on the basis of a review of the literature  
 
and their own data,  indicate  that schools identify  a number of reasons  for including  
 
pupils in decision making exercises. They found few schools citing children’s rights as  
 
the key driver for pupil  participation. Consequently, when considering the role of  
 
dialogue to support the participation of children,  it is important to make a distinction  
 
between approaches which develop the skills of children as future citizens and  those  
 
which  facilitate children’s  decision making rights in the present.  This paper is  
 
concerned with  the latter emphasis and therefore explores  dialogic approaches for their  
 
participatory as opposed to their pedagogic potential.  
 
 
 
 
2.2 Dialogue and Children’s Active Participation in the Present 
 
 
When the rights of children to participate in the here and now are emphasised,  
 
it can be argued that there is a need to focus on the development of  processes which  
 
allow children to participate,   rather than on the development of the skills needed by  
 
children in order to  participate as adult citizens. The role of dialogue in such processes  
 
has been recognised  in the literature on children’s participation rights.  Fattore and  
 
Turnbull (2005), argue that as children are able to engage in intersubjective  
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understandings  with others, they can  enter into  inter-generational communication and  
 
that dialogue is therefore  vital to their  participation. They also draw on  Habermas’s  
 
theory of  democracy  and look at the social and cultural institutions and organisations  
 
that involve children.  Fattore and Turnbull however do not view these as arenas for the  
 
development of children’s skills.  Rather, they see them as places where adults and  
 
children can engage in dialogic encounters. Such encounters can in turn enable the  
 
participation of children either through direct decision making  functions  or  by ensuring  
 
that  adults are  more able to work on behalf of children in more formal political arenas.  
 
Hill et al. (2004), also emphasise dialogue as important to participatory processes.  They  
 
cite the work of  Moss and Petrie which conceptualises children’s services as ‘children’s  
 
spaces’. Hill et al., suggest that this implies space for ‘dialogue, confrontation,  
 
deliberation and critical thinking’ (p. 84).  
 
 
 
It is  however important to critically consider what exactly dialogue can contribute to  
 
participatory processes  as this has not been fully addressed in the literature discussed 
 
thus  far.  A fuller consideration of the role of dialogue is developed in the participatory  
 
research literature. Dialogue is a central feature of participatory research   (van der Reit,  
 
2008).  Participatory  research focuses on participation and action in the present 
 
(Park, 2001; O’Kane, 2000).   In Fielding’s (2004), discussion of participatory research  
 
with children,  he emphasises the centrality of dialogic processes.  He points in  
 
an interesting theoretical direction when he argues that  it is not so much the content but  
 
that act of dialogue  which offers hope.   Fielding’s discussion considers these processes  
 
in some detail. He argues that participatory research has the potential to shift the  
 10 
 
perspective of both researcher and  participants.  The role of dialogue in shifting  
 
perspectives, and the potential this has for  transformation in participatory research, has  
 
also been considered  at an epistemological  level in a helpful paper by van der Reit  
 
(2008). It has already been contended that participatory activity must offer the potential  
 
for change for without this, it will be politically impotent.  If dialogue is to offer anything  
 
to participatory practice then it must have transformative potential.   
 
 
Having considered perspectives on children’s participation and the emerging emphasis on  
 
dialogue, it is important now to consider dialogic mechanisms and their  potential  
 
for participatory practice.  The next section will therefore consider dialogic theory in  
 
in order to explore its potential for participatory practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION THREE 
 
Theorising dialogic 
 
3.1 Introduction and definitions 
 
It is important to explore theoretical explanations of dialogue in order to understand how  
 
it might support  participation.  Consideration will be given initially to the ways in  
 
which dialogue and dialogic are defined within the literature. 
 
 
Dialogue has aroused multi-disciplinary interest and a range of academic traditions has 
 
built up around the concept (Mifsud and Johnson, 2000; Renshaw, 2004).  Mifsud and 
 
Johnson (2000), suggest that these traditions are built on differing paradigms and this 
 11 
 
leads to variation  in  conceptualisations of dialogue and definitional confusion. 
 
Wegerif (2007), observes that the term dialogic is used extensively but meanings vary. 
 
He identifies four uses of dialogic: 
 
 pertaining to dialogue:  referring  to the activity of  shared inquiry. 
  
 texts which are not monologic:  the view that all texts  contain multiple competing  
 
     and cooperating voices      
 
 as epistemological paradigm : where the meaning of an utterance  
 
resides in its location within a dialogue rather than in the utterance itself 
 
 as social ontology : a philosophical position competing  with modernist 
 
     western notions of humans as bounded selves. The dialogic self is defined through  
 
    dialogue with others. 
 
 
 
 
For Wegerif (2008), grasping dialogic as ontology has immense practical significance. 
 
The development of dialogic ontology has been heavily influenced by Bakhtin (Salgado 
 
and Hermans, 2005).  Bakhtin’s position is paradoxical and dialogic for him, involves the  
 
coming together of opposing positions, yet maintains the differences between them. The  
 
aim of dialogue from this perspective is not to reach a convergence of self and other  
 
in intersubjective agreement (Wegerif, 2007).  Wegerif defines ‘dialogic space’ as “a  
 
space in which different perspectives are held in tension in a way which  does not lead to  
 
resolution but produces  sparks of insight, learning and  creativity” ( p118). Dialogic  
 
ontology is based on the interplay of  same-different/self- other which neither leads to 
 
fusion,  nor to the maintainence of difference as a ‘stand-off’ position. Dialogic is  
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continuously dynamic and open. In this way, Markova (2003), argues that a dialogic  
 
ontology is able to account for ‘innovation, creativity  and change’ (p255).  It is this 
 
transformative aspect of a  dialogical approach,  as discussed above , which has particular 
 
significance to participation practices. This will be explored now through a more detailed 
 
consideration of the literature in this area.  
 
 
3.2 Dialogic theory, possibilities and problems  
 
In an attempt to steer a course through this complex and contested area the following  
 
questions will be used to  interrogate the literature:  
 
1. can dialogic approaches offer a solution to the problems of the tyrannies of  objectivist  
 
   approaches to children’s voice and the  fragmentation of critical voice work ?  
 
2. By what mechanisms might dialogic encounters lead to transformation? 
 
3. What is the impact on dialogic relations where there are power differences between  
 
    partners? 
 
 
The first question arises from issues raised in the introduction regarding the philosophical  
 
difficulties emerging from the literature on ‘voice’  and considers the extent to which  
 
dialogic approaches might overcome these problems. The second question concerns the 
 
transformative potential of dialogue and the processes involved in this.   The final  
 
question enables consideration of the problems of the politics of dialogue and is of  
 
particular practical significance.  
 
 
The problems posed by objectivism and extreme relativism have been discussed in the  
 
literature on selfhood, by scholars such as Hermans and Markova ( Salgado and  
 
Hermans, 2005).  In their theoretical development of a dialogical  self, they provide a  
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bridge between these extremes.  If knowledge is assumed to exist only within categories  
 
of knowers, then there is neither basis for communication nor genuine  purpose in  
 
participative exercises.  If an objectivist position is assumed however, then subjectivities  
 
are ignored and children’s experiential differences are not captured. Markova, like  
 
Fattore and Turnbull (2005), suggests that intersubjectivity allows a closing of the  
 
distance between self and others.  She argues however that if communication is to lead  
 
to change, creativity or innovation, then there must be more to it than intersubjectivity.  It  
 
is her contention that dialogue goes beyond mutuality thus avoids  the self being  
 
subsumed within the subjectivities of the other.   She adopts a  Bakhtinian  position,  
 
arguing that dialogic participants are ‘co-authors’ of their ideas  and that  “co-authorship 
 
demands evaluation of the other, struggle with the other and  judgement of the message 
 
of the  other” (Markova, 2003, p256).  
 
 
It is the contention of this paper,  that Markova’s view on the limits of intersubjectivity 
 
to an understanding of dialogic processes is extremely helpful.  Markova’ position  
 
allows for evaluation and judgement of the perspective of the other. This is not the  
 
judgement or evaluation of  a bounded, imperialistic  self.  It is a position which  
 
recognises the fluidity of the boundaries between self and others and therefore allows the 
 
possibility of personal transformation of both self and other ( Markova, 2003).  For  
 
Markova, dialogic approaches make communication both meaningful and transformative.  
 
This theoretical position is of relevance to those considering how to develop processes  
 
which are open to children’s participation,  as opposed to developing children’s skills in  
 
order to prepare them for future participation in existing  processes.  This positions adds  
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theoretical weight to calls from writers such as Hill et al. (2004), for the central  
 
positioning of dialogic approaches in participatory practice.  
 
 
This leads directly to the second question which concerns transformative mechanisms  
 
within dialogic encounters.  Here the literature is particularly complex and definitions  
 
contested.  Wegerif (2008), for example makes much of the distinction between dialogic 
 
and dialectic mechanisms of change.  Poonamallee (2006), argues that the key  
 
distinction between dialectic and dialogic is that in a dialectical  approach equilibrium is  
 
established  through a synthesis borne from the fusion of conflicting  positions, whereas a  
 
dialogic ontology assumes a reality in a continuous state of  flux.  This flux is the result  
 
of the continuous negotiation between different voices in dialogue. 
 
 
Markova’s notion of a dialogic self, is important as it avoids fusion of the other with the  
 
self in the dialogic encounter.  Wegerif (2007), argues that for some postmodernist  
 
thinkers, making a distinction between dialogic and dialectic is crucial,  as in dialectic 
 
where  two opposing  positions are synthesized, self can subsume other in a ‘totalising  
 
system of explanation and  control’ (p 35).  Vasterling (2003),  similarly argues that a  
 
dialectic mechanism of change is problematic.  For her, “recognition of plurality and  
 
other  is important because it enables the critical function of open dialogue” (p167).  It  
 
can be argued that in reaching synthesis through a dialectic process, otherness is defeated, 
 
dialogue shuts down and there is no  mechanism for self critique and change.  
 
 
Mifsud and Johnson (2000),  identify dialectics with an epistemological position which 
 
assumes that  some truth about reality is known before the dialogue takes place.  This 
 
understanding of dialectic, explains Wegerif‘s (2007), description  of  Freire as dialectic  
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as opposed to  dialogic.  Freire, influenced by Marx, used dialogue to dispel ‘false  
 
consciousness’ and motivate  students to action.  In using Philosophy for Children, or any  
 
other tool to  facilitate participation, it might appear that there is a desired end point.  The 
 
truth that is ‘known’ before the dialogue takes place, is that children are marginalized.  
 
Any approach which uses dialogue explicitly as an emancipatory tool would by this  
 
reckoning be dialectic as opposed to dialogic.  
 
 
 
There is confusion however as some of the literature, particularly in the area of  
 
participatory research  (for example, van der Reit, 2008),  uses  both dialectic and  
 
dialogic in explaining  the mechanisms  of change. For some writers however, the  
 
distinction between these two processes of change may not be as sharp as suggested  by  
 
Wegerif.   Mifsud and Johnson (2000), writing from within the discipline of  
 
communication, argue that the terms dialogic and dialectic are not so easily distinguished.  
 
They demonstrate from examples in recent thinking within their discipline, that dialectic 
 
does not necessarily imply synthesis or overcoming  tensions or that  dialogue  ever  
 
closes down. They cite Baxter, who uses the term ‘dialectical dialogue’ (p94), to describe  
 
this more open conceptualisation of dialectic processes.  
 
 
Kennedy’s (1999), distinction between teleogical and non-teleological approaches to 
 
dialogue is similarly complex.   He  examines Socratic dialogue using these concepts.   
 
Kennedy draws on a distinction developed by Burbules and suggests that ‘teleological’  
 
dialogue (p346)  assumes a resolution which can be known in advance and  can be led to  
 
by a skilled facilitator. ‘Non-teleological’ dialogue however does not assume that a  
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resolution will be reached.  If dialogue takes place in a way which does not subsume the  
 
‘otherness’ of  others in a synthesis,  then there can be no resolution and dialogue will  
 
remain open and live.   
 
 
In response to the question of the mechanisms by which dialogue might facilitate change,  
 
distinctions between dialectic and dialogic mechanisms are somewhat unclear clear due  
 
to varieties of  definition across disciplines. The extent to which dialogue remains open  
 
and maintains a critical function so that both self and other (s) are provided with a  
 
 ‘catalyst for  distanciation and critical reflection’ (van der  Reit, 2008, p 557), is crucial.  
 
This is how dialogical space is understood. It is not merely creating space or time for  
 
dialogue to take place.  Kennedy (1999), argues that dialogue is much more than ideas.  
 
Dialogic space from the perspective of a dialogic ontology, is the space which opens up 
 
between persons, whose boundaries are fluid and in constant  negotiation. 
 
It is this fluidity which ‘opens a space of transformative potential’ (Kennedy, 1999, 
 
 p 340).  Thus it contains the possibility of future action or improvement and is thus  
 
crucial to genuine participatory practice.  If dialogue is being used as a vehicle  
 
to reach a specific direction, such as in the work of Freire, then the dialogue is  
 
teleological and depending on one’s definition, dialectical.  Approaches to participation  
 
which involve education through participation, as discussed above, can be argued to  
 
involve teleological dialogue,  as there is a clear aim for the  activity. This aim is to train  
 
children through dialogue for skills which will enable them  to participate in the  future.   
 
Where adults and  children engage in dialogue as part of an activity that accepts  
 
children’s right to participative decision making in the present, then it can be argued that  
 
the agenda  remains open  and the dialogue is non-teleological.  From this it can be  
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argued that the most important aspect of dialogue is the extent to which the views of the  
 
partners  are  held in tension and allowed to spark off each other in ways which 
 
lead to creativity and transformation.  
 
 
For some however, true dialogic encounter requires the engagement of equals in the  
 
dialogic process (Vasterling, 2003).  This leads to the third question and examines  
 
the implications of  power differences between dialogic partners. Where children 
 
are being considered this is an important issue.  Power differentials between children and  
 
adults are well theorised in the sociology of childhood.  Hill (2006), on this basis,  
 
emphasises the need to recognise the political context  within which participatory 
 
activities take place.  The political context includes power differentials between adults  
 
and  children but also between children themselves. As noted above, children’s voices are  
 
not  necessarily harmonious  as they emerge from very different experiences.  Bernstein  
 
(as cited in  Arnot and Reay, 2007),  recognises these difficulties in relation to pupil voice 
 
work when he contends that there is a  need to consider how voices  are produced and   
 
reproduced in the classroom.  This is an explicit acknowledgement of the impact of wider  
 
inequalities on children’s experiences.  On this basis, Arnot and Reay ( 2007),  warn  
 
against the naïve assumption that eliciting  pupil talk in the classroom  will, of itself,   
 
shift existing power relations. 
 
 
 
The work of Moghaddam (2003) is of relevance here and can be used to challenge  
 
Fattore and Turnbull’s emphasis on intersubjectivity in the participation of children.  For  
 
Moghadden, intersubjectivity is limited in its explanatory power because it does not  
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explain at the  inter-group level and  ‘fails to incorporate power inequalities’ (p 224). 
 
He argues that intersubjectivity must be balanced with what he terms ‘interobjectivity’. 
 
Interobjectivity refers to the understandings of objective reality that are shared between 
 
individuals and groups,  and  between groups.  Moghaddam bases his position on  
 
empirical work in social psychology ( mainly in the Social Identity Theory),  which  
 
demonstrates  that more powerful groups and  individuals are able to “ ‘help’ shape   
 
understandings of the world held by those with less  power.”(p 224).   His work  
 
encourages consideration of the ways in which power differentials between groups can  
 
shape their understandings of the world.   
 
 
Dialogic encounters,  it was argued above,  have transformative  potential as they allow  
 
both self and other to engage in critical reflection.  Vasterling (2003), writing from a  
 
feminist perspective,  questions  the critical potential of the I-other relationship where  
 
there is  inequality between the partners. Using the example of marital rape, she argues  
 
that legal change is sometimes needed to achieve what dialogue alone is unable to  
 
achieve.  She argues that where there are significant inequalities, that dialogue is  
 
powerless and legislative responses are required to support the voice of the  subjugated  
 
other.  Accepting this argument would render powerless any attempts to use dialogic  
 
approaches to facilitate children’s participation as children are less powerful than adults  
 
That legislative change is possible however, implies that there must be some hope.  
 
Surely there is a possible place for the transformative potential of dialogue in the pressure 
 
 leading to reform.  
 
 
 
Jackson (2008), expresses some hope in her discussion of dialogic pedagogy 
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and social justice.  Recognising that classroom practice is of limited impact on the world  
 
outside of the  classroom,  she argues that there is a need to hold onto possibilities that  
 
dialogic teaching might have to offer individual students within the educational context.  
 
Although it would appear to be naïve about the extent of the transformative capabilities  
 
of dialogic  approaches,  it can be argued that they offer interesting possibilities for those  
 
engaged in participatory practices with children both at a practical and a philosophical  
 
level.   In the light of the potential difficulties posed by inequalities between dialogic  
 
partners, practitioners  require to adopt a critically reflexive stance  in their use of  
 
dialogic approaches as participatory devices.  
 
 
 
This section has considered the possibilities offered by dialogic approaches in providing  
 
a means  to genuine communication between different voices and in particular between  
 
the voices of  different generations. It has also considered the transformative mechanisms  
 
of dialogic and their  political limitations.  The next section will consider these issues in  
 
relation to Philosophy for Children which is one approach to engaging children in 
 
dialogue and will critically explore  its potential as a dialogic participatory mechanism.  
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 4    
 
Philosophy for Children, dialogue and participation 
 
4.1  Philosophy  For Children as a dialogic mechanism 
 
 
Having critically examined dialogic approaches and considered their potential for 
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participatory practice, this section will now consider whether Philosophy for Children can  
 
be conceptualised as a dialogic  participatory  mechanism.  This will initially involve  
 
looking at whether Philosophy for Children  is a genuinely dialogic approach. Given that  
 
Philosphy for Children consists ‘entirely of inducting children into dialogues’ ( Wegerif,  
 
2007, p 102), it would be expected that its status as a dialogic approach would be  
 
uncontested.  Dialogism, as we have seen however involves more than engagement in  
 
dialogue.  
 
 
Claims have been made about Philosophy for Children’s dialogic status (Fisher, 2007),  
 
but these have been disputed in some quarters.  Vansieleghem  (2005),  contends that 
 
Philosophy for Children is problematic because in it is governed by a political agenda  
 
that privileges particular forms of thinking and behaviour.  For Vanseilegham, this  
 
leads to the exclusion of ‘other’ voices and reproduces existing discourses. She  
 
recognises the need for a genuinely dialogical confrontation with ‘otherness’  but argues  
 
that the Socratic tradition emphases one  particular way of teaching thinking.  In her  
 
view,  Philosophy for Children can be  approached instrumentally,  and as such,  can  lose  
 
sight of the transformative value of experiencing the presence of the other.  Philosophy   
 
for Children,  according to Vanseilegham,   needs to be re- interpreted  dialogically as in  
 
her view, the procedure is dialectic and attempts to  reach a synthesis or conclusion  
 
through the  questioning process. The difficulty of distinguishing dialectic from dialogic  
 
mechanisms  has already been discussed. The extent to which the dialogue allows self  
 
and  other (s) to  meet in a space of ongoing negotiation  where  dialogue remains open   
 
and difference is  maintained in creative tension, is however key to dialogic  
 
understanding.  
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Vanseilegham’s emphasis on the dangers of an instrumentalist approach to Philosophy  
 
for Children,  through a procedural reliance on the Socratic method, is timely given the  
 
current explosion of interest in Philosophy for Children  as a pedagogic tool.  She does 
 
not  however respond to Kennedy’s (1999)  paper on Philosophy for Children.  Kennedy  
 
(1999), although recognising the Socratic approach as dialectic, conceptualises  
 
children’s communities of philosophical inquiry as both dialogic and potentially  
 
transformative.  For Kennedy, philosophical inquiry is teleological to the extent that  
 
follows ‘the inquiry where it leads’ (p346), but non- teleological in that it is not possible 
 
to predict the direction or even be sure that a direction exists.  On this basis, Kennedy 
 
argues for the dialogicality of philosophical inquiry, as it is chaotic, emergent, and open.  
 
He argues that communal dialogue challenges the western tradition of  philosophy as an   
 
individual, rational endeavour.   Philosophy for Children, viewed from  this perspective,  
 
engages children and adults  in dialogue where there is ‘no final closure,  because of the  
 
stubborn, perdurance of the multiplicity of individual  perspectives which  can ….be  
 
coordinated but never subsumed.’ (Kennedy, 1999, p349).   On this basis  Philosophy for 
 
Children, can be viewed as dialogical.  
 
 
Murris (2008),  in a very helpful discussion of this issue, raises concern not so much with  
 
the community of inquiry model but with the potential instrumentalism of   Philosophy  
 
for Children as it becomes increasingly packaged and marketed.  She uses an interesting 
 
quote from Plato in which  Socrates suggests  that the perplexity others feel in the 
 
presence of his questioning,  is actually a projection of his own perplexity.  Murris’s  
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creative use of this quote, enables her to  highlight the potential dangers of the recent  
 
popularity in Philosophy for Children as a  ‘method’ and encourages teachers to embrace 
 
the perplexities involved in engaging in the process.  She presents the stance of the  
 
teacher  as very  different to that of the trained  and  knowing facilitator  who is guiding  
 
participants towards ‘truth’.  The open-endedness suggested by Murris  fits more readily 
 
with a dialogic approach. The thrust of Murris’s argument is that in using Philosophy  
 
for Children, practitioners need to avoid easy solutions to tensions and difficulties as  
 
these are likely to close down dialogue. Examples of such tensions from the writer’s  
 
own research of primary school inquiries, include children raising  potentially painful 
 
emotional issues or views being expressed which conflict with  the ethical norms of the  
 
school or culture.  Such tensions might create discomfort and perplexity in teacher and 
 
children  but it can be argued that they  offer that  genuine encounter with otherness  
 
which  characterise dialogic approaches.  
 
 
It is important to recognise however that philosophical inquiries are socially and 
 
politically situated.  The extent to which an individual teacher might tolerate ‘Socratic 
 
perplexity’  is likely to be influenced by the many factors which impact on  classroom  
 
practice.  Attitudes of school managers, parental influence on school and quality  
 
assurance bodies for example, are likely to  influence  curricular  and pedagogic  
 
decisions.  An individual community of inquiry therefore exists within a wider structure  
 
whose influence is likely to impact on its potential as a dialogic mechanism.   
 
 
 
So can Philosophy for Children be conceptualised as a dialogic mechanism?  It is clear 
 
from the discussion so far that this is not straightforward.  While Philosophy for Children 
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promotes dialogue , this is not sufficient to qualify it as a dialogic mechanism. Concerns 
 
have been raised about its Socratic roots and on this   basis the extent to which it can be  
 
genuinely dialogic has been questioned.   The arguments of both Kennedy and Murris  
 
however are persuasive and therefore it can be contended  that  Philosophy for Children  
 
can be dialogical.  Practitioners need to be alert to the dangers of  ‘over training’ in   
 
technique and the need to allow themselves to tolerate perplexity if  philosophical  
 
inquiries are to be dialogical.  This requires a process of ongoing reflexivity. The current  
 
favouring of dialogue as pedagogy, as discussed in section two, may muddy the waters  
 
for those attempting to use Philosophy for Children  in a genuinely dialogical way. Its use  
 
in schools is likely to locate it among a range of  competing agendas  such as attainment  
 
raising or the development of citizenship skills.  Those attempting to employ Philosophy  
 
for  Children in a dialogic fashion need to be very clear in their aims.  The potentially  
 
unsettling experiences of teachers engaging with children in this process may be  
 
supported through dialogic encounters  with fellow teachers.   Ongoing support is likely  
 
to be required to enable the practitioner to retain a critical gaze on the process if it is to  
 
operate dialogically. The nature of that support needs to be very carefully considered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Philosophy for Children  as a participatory mechanism 
 
The question of the dialogicality of Philosophy for Children,   appears to have received  
 
more direct treatment in the literature than that  of its participatory potential.  Philosophy  
 
for Children’s  educative function for future participation has certainly been recognised.   
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Fisher (2003), refers to its role in the development of the ‘the future transformers’ (p11)  
 
of the world. This future orientation  appears to place Philosophy for Children,  in  
 
Biesta’s (2006), categorisation  as education  for, or  through democracy.  This paper is  
 
primarily concerned with  participation in the present and the extent to which suggestions   
 
such as those  of Todd  (2007),  that Philosophy for Children  might be a vehicle of   
 
‘authentic participation’ are  reasonable.  
 
 
The position taken in this paper, is that participatory approaches should be a means of  
 
involving children in transformative action in the present.  A dialogic perspective, as 
 
argued above, may avoid the difficulties inherent in both  objectivist and relativist  
 
approaches to children’s voice. Dialogic theory offers the potential of a genuine meeting 
 
of self and other and contains transformative potential ( Markova, 2003).  This position  
 
also underpins van der Reit’s (2008),  analysis of the role of dialogue in participatory  
 
research where it is the meeting of self and other allows both an empathic and a  
 
distanciated  perspective. For her, genuine dialogue involves a dialectical relationship 
 
between these two perspectives which provides the means for developing critical 
 
reflection.  For van der Reit, this is the epistemological catalyst for transformation and it  
 
is both  participants and  researcher who are subject to transformation.  It is possible to  
 
argue that the extent to which Philosophy for Children  is practiced in a way  which is   
 
genuinely dialogical,  where there is a genuine encounter with ‘otherness’ for all involved  
 
in the process,   will determine the extent to  which it is genuinely  participatory.  Further,  
 
it may be argued that where the process is dialogical that it offers opportunities to  
 
develop and practice skills which will enable children’s  participation in the future.   
 
This future orientation however is different to approaches discussed in section two which  
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rest on an asymmetrical pupil-teacher relationship where teachers scaffold the  
 
development of specific skills. Rather it is the experience of the dialogic process itself  
 
which will allow children to participate in the present and  at the same time practice skills  
 
which will have value for their future participation.   
 
 
 
 
It is clear that that Philosophy for Children, as described in the literature, unlike  
 
participatory research approaches ( O’Kane, 2000),  does not necessarily have a praxis 
 
dimension.  It is currently most often associated with developing thinking skills  
 
(McGuiness, 2005).  Its emphasis on logical, rational thought may limit its participatory  
 
potential.  As such, it cannot fulfil O’Kane’s (2000) criteria for participatory methods  
 
because it has no focus on support for further action.   Here critical theory’s breach of the  
 
modernist distinction between knowledge and practice ( Cohen, Manion and Morrison,  
 
2007) might be helpful.  It is possible that a praxis orientation could be developed by a 
 
 community of  inquiry.   For Kennedy, allowing children to enter philosophical dialogue  
 
offers transformative possibilities for philosophy itself.  Breaching the thinking and  
 
praxis  divide might be one such possibility and this is worthy of further exploration.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Philosophy for Children, participation and equality 
 
 
The difficulty of power differentials between children and between children and adults,  
 
is the final issue to be considered when examining Philosophy for Children’s potential as  
 
both a dialogic and a participatory  mechanism.  This problem is not unique to  
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Philosophy for Children as we have seen.  The issues here are similar to those raised by  
 
Jackson (2008), who discusses dialogic teaching as a route to social justice.  It is  
 
Jackson’s contention that ground rules for classroom talk   privilege one sort of discourse  
 
over others,  as those  children most  confident in privileged forms of  discourse are more  
 
able to subtly subvert  the  rules. There are links here with Bernstein’s emphasis on the  
 
ways in which voices are  reproduced in the classroom.  This has direct relevance to  
 
Philosophy for Children where rules of engagement are generally established as part of  
 
the process (Fisher, 2003).   Jackson discusses approaches taken by those who have  
 
attempted to silence the  voice of the privileged and raise the voice of the marginalized in  
 
their  classrooms as a  means to overcome  these issues.  In her view, this is problematic  
 
for a number of  reasons, including the  need for the teacher to make assumptions about  
 
privilege on the  basis of  appearance.  Like Arnot and Reay (2007), she  adopts  the  
 
position that changing  classroom talk cannot tackle structural inequality leaving  
 
practitioners who recognise the impact of such  inequalities in a quandary.   Jackson  
 
however suggests that awareness  of these dilemmas enables practitioners to  consider the  
 
possibility of   ‘ there being   better and worse actions one can take as a conscientious  
 
educator.’(p144).   In accepting this, it is important to avoid instrumentalist attempts to  
 
resolve such issues. This further reinforces the need for practitioner reflexivity.  Perhaps 
 
those adopting dialogical approaches to their own professional development and  support   
 
might develop and  maintain the critical reflexivity needed to operate as  ‘conscientious  
 
educators’.  
 
 
 
 
 27 
SECTION FIVE   
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has considered two key issues, the contribution of dialogic approaches  
 
to participatory practices with children and the extent to which  Philosophy for Children  
 
can be conceptualised as a dialogic,  participatory tool  which can support such 
 
practices.  The paper has explored links between participation and dialogue, and   
 
conceptualisations of dialogue in order to address these  questions.  It has been argued  
 
that  dialogic approaches offer a way through the philosophical problems encountered by  
 
both objectivism and extreme  relativist approaches to the ‘voices’ of the children.  
 
Dialogic approaches it is contended,   provide a  means  to genuine communication  
 
between  different voices and the voices of  different generations. The transformative  
 
mechanisms  which underpin  dialogic approaches have been argued to have particular  
 
significance to  those seeking to work in participatory  ways with children.  Dialogic  
 
approaches are  however politically situated and dialogic partners are not necessarily  
 
equally powerful.  These factors may impose limits on the transformative potential of any  
 
dialogic approach  and those working in the sphere need to be realistic in their   
 
expectations and responsible  in how they communicate these to the children with whom  
 
they work.  
 
 
Where practitioners wish to use Philosophy for Children as a dialogic, participatory  
 
tool, it is concluded that they must be able to tolerate the potential perplexity and  
 
discomfort of genuinely open dialogue. This being the case, Philosophy for Children  
 
it has been argued,  can be  regarded as dialogic.  School based work however is likely to  
 
be challenging  given the  various competing agendas operating in schools.  It has been  
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further argued that Philosophy for Children’s emphasis on thinking,  limits its  
 
participatory potential. This might be overcome if a praxis focus can be developed within  
 
a community of inquiry.  
 
 
Dialogic approaches offer exciting possibilities which extend well beyond the  
 
enhancement of children’s learning experiences. Dialogic offers the potential to provide  
 
a way out of the  philosophical  difficulties presented by the literature on ‘voice’. Further,  
 
dialogism  appears to have  transformative potential, albeit limited by the political  
 
contexts within which dialogic practices take place.  Philosophy for Children, can be 
 
viewed as a dialogic  approach and with the caveats mentioned above, might  support  
 
participatory practice.  Fielding (2004), suggests that change requires a shift  
 
of what being a pupil and a teacher actually means.  Philosophy for Children, if it  
 
maintains Murris’s notion of ‘Socratic perplexity’,  arguably  has the potential to  
 
contribute to this shift in perspective and may well  enable what Fielding refers to as a  
 
‘rupture the ordinary’ (Fielding, 2004, p 296).  
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